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PREFERENCE IDENTIFICATION
CHRISTOPHER P. CHAMBERS, FEDERICO ECHENIQUE,
AND NICOLAS S. LAMBERT
Abstract. An experimenter seeks to learn a subject’s preference relation.
The experimenter produces pairs of alternatives. For each pair, the subject
is asked to choose. We argue that, in general, large but finite data do not
give close approximations of the subject’s preference, even when the limiting
(countably infinite) data are enough to infer the preference perfectly. We
provide sufficient conditions on the set of alternatives, preferences, and
sequences of pairs so that the observation of finitely many choices allows
the experimenter to learn the subject’s preference with arbitrary precision.
While preferences can be identified under our sufficient conditions, we show
that it is harder to identify utility functions. We illustrate our results
with several examples, including consumer choice, expected utility, and
preferences in the Anscombe-Aumann model.
1. Introduction
Consider a subject who forms a preference over the objects, or alternatives,
in some set X . The subject participates in an experiment in which he is
presented with a sequence of pairs of alternatives. For each pair, the subject is
asked to choose one of the two alternatives offered. What can an experimenter
learn about the subject’s preference from observing these binary comparisons?
Suppose that, after every observation, the experimenter computes an estimate
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of the subject’s preference consistent with the data observed up that point:
the experimenter chooses a preference rationalizing the choices made by the
subject. Is the estimate a good approximation of the subject’s underlying
preference, for a large but finite experiment?
In this paper, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of preference estimates
from finite experiments. We ask if one can fully identify the preference of a
subject at the limit with finite data. It is a question of preference identification,
in the classical sense of the term.1
To illustrate the key issues, consider the following example. Let X ⊆ Rn
represent a set of consumption bundles. The subject has a preference, denoted
by ∗, over the elements of X . Over time, the subject is asked to choose an
alternative from sets Bk = {xk, yk}, where k is the time index. Together, the
sets B1, B2, . . . , Bk form a finite experiment. The experimenter observes the
subject’s choice of bundle for every pair. Assume the choice is consistent with
the subject’s preference, so that if x is chosen over y, then x ∗ y. Note that
we can only, at best, infer the preference of the subject on the set B ≡ ∪∞k=1Bk.
Thus, if the subject’s preference behaves very differently outside of the set B,
there is no hope to obtain a fine approximation of the subject’s preference over
the entire set X . Two natural conditions emerge. First, we require that ∗
be continuous, so one can hope to approximate the preference from finitely
many samples. Second, we require that the set B is dense in X , so that the
observations are sufficiently spread out. And indeed, we show that, under these
conditions, if one can observe the preference of the subject over the whole set
B, then one can infer precisely ∗ on X .
The two conditions, continuity of ∗ and denseness of B, are, however, not
enough to provide good approximations of ∗ from finitely many observations.
Knowledge of the preference over the infinite set B allows the experimenter
1 Standard decision-theoretic language reserves the term identified for a relation between
preference and utility. In that context, a model is identified if every preference relation is
represented by a unique (up to some class of transformations) set of parameters. Thus,
identification in this sense requires the knowledge of an entire preference relation. In this
paper, we do not assume knowledge of the entire preference relation. Instead, we ask if one
can learn the entire preference relation with a possibly large, but nonetheless finite data set.
We discuss the identification of utility functions in Section 3.4, and the relation to decision
theory in Section 4.2.
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to exploit the continuity assumption on the subject’s preference. With finite
data, continuity does not have enough bite. To illustrate, take X = [0, 1], and
suppose that the preference of the subject over X is captured by the binary
relation ≥ (greater numbers are always preferred). Consider the countable
set of objects B = Q ∩ (0, 1), and B1, B2, . . . an enumeration of pairs of
objects of B. Then, any continuous preference that agrees with ≥ on Q has 1
weakly preferred to 0. However, for any n, one can find a preference n that
rationalizes the choices of the subject over B1, . . . , Bn, and yet that ranks 0
strictly above 1.
In fact, one can come up with an even more startling example: we show that
no matter the subject’s preference, the experimenter may end up inferring that
the subject is indifferent among all alternatives (see Section 3.1). And yet, as in
the example just described, she would be able to infer the subject’s preference
perfectly, had she access to the subject’s preference over the infinite set B all
at once. The example exhibits a kind of discontinuity. With infinite data in
the form of B, we must conclude that x ≻ y, but any finite data cannot rule
out that y  x.
These examples illustrate the dangers of data-driven estimation. Non-
parametric estimation with finite data can behave very differently from es-
timation with infinite (even countable) data. To derive meaningful estimates,
one must construct a theory that disciplines the preferences, and lays down
the proper conditions for convergence of preference estimates.
This paper includes three sets of results.
Our first and foremost results concern non-parametric estimation. We offer
fairly general conditions so that observing sufficiently many binary choices
allows one to approximate the subject’s preference arbitrarily closely with any
preference that rationalizes the finite data.
We provide two notions of rationalization, a weak and a strong one. Under
strong rationalization, a rationalizing preference must reflect choices perfectly.
So if one alternative is chosen over another, the preference must rank the first
strictly above the second. Under weak rationalization, the first alternative
must only be ranked at least as good as the second. Weak alternatives reflect
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the phenomenon of partial observability (Chambers et al., 2014) whereby one
cannot infer anything from a choice that was not made.
Under both notions of rationalization, it is necessary to add structure on the
environment and on the rationalizing preferences so as to avoid the negative
results of the example above. Importantly, we need a notion of objective ratio-
nality expressed by the monotonicity of preferences. We postulate an exoge-
nous partial ordering of the set of alternatives—for example, standard vector
dominance when the set of alternatives represents consumption bundles, or
stochastic dominance when it is the set of lotteries over monetary amounts—
and we require that the subject’s preference is monotonic with respect to that
exogenous order.
With this structure, finite-experiment rationalizable preferences converge to
the subject’s underlying preference, under conditions that are consistent with
many applications in decision theory, and with experimental implementations
of decision theoretic models. Stronger conditions are needed to obtain the
result for weak rationalization—conditions that hold for preferences over Eu-
clidean spaces, but rule out some common applications in decision theory—yet
it is remarkable that convergence is at all attained under weak rationalization.
By remaining agnostic about choices that were not made, we are inferring a
lot less about the subject’s preferences under the assumption of weak ratio-
nalization than under strong.
Our results on preference identification are relevant to a wide range of con-
texts. For concreteness, we illustrate their application to the special case of
preferences over lotteries, dated rewards, consumption bundles, and Anscombe-
Aumann acts (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963). In all these cases, there is
a natural objective partial order and monotonicity is a sensible assumption.
There are other environments in which one cannot reasonably impose any kind
of monotonicity. For instance, in the literature on discrete allocation (such as
in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) or in the recent literature on school choice,
such as in Pathak and Sethuraman (2011)) in which agents are assumed to
choose among lotteries over finitely many heterogeneous objects. Monotonic-
ity would require that all agents agree on a ranking of the discrete objects that
are being allocated, an unreasonable requirement.
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Our second set of results concerns the identification of utility functions.
Given a utility representation for the agent’s preference, we show that it is
possible to carefully select finite-data utility rationalizations so as to approx-
imate the subject’s utility arbitrarily closely. This result also rests on mono-
tonicity assumptions. However, there is a clear difference between estimating
preferences and utilities. While any preference estimate converges to the true
underlying preference, for utilities we only know that a certain selection con-
verges. This observation is especially relevant when estimating utilities of a
particular functional form. There is no guarantee that such utility estimates
have the correct asymptotic behavior; one can only say that the preferences
that these utilities represent do.
Our third and final results concern the identification of preferences with in-
finite but countable data. We show that, when the experimenter has access
to the preference of the subject over all alternatives of a countable set, then
it is possible to recover perfectly the subject’s preference over the entire set of
alternatives X under much weaker conditions than above. We further demon-
strate that, under such conditions, the experimenter can, in theory, obtain
the subject’s preference directly from the observation of a single choice of the
subject when the subject is asked to select an object among a large, infinite
set.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After reviewing the liter-
ature, we describe the model in Section 2. We present our main results for
important cases of collections of alternatives in Section 3 and discuss these
results in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our main results for general col-
lections of alternatives. In Section 6, we study the relation between preference
and utility, and provide conditions under which the identification of a prefer-
ence makes it possible to identify a utility, and conversely. In Section 7, we
further show that when the set of possible utilities is compact, one can obtain
a strong form of identification, which dispenses with the postulate of existence
of a data-generating preference. We discuss the question of preference iden-
tification with infinite but countable data in Section 8. Finally, in Section 9,
we offer interpretations on the meaning of a data-generating preference. We
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relegate the proofs and more technical results to the appendices (some of these
results may be of independent interest).
Literature Review. Experimentalists and decision theorists have an obvious
interest in preference estimation, but we are not aware of any study of the
behavior of preference estimates from finite experiments. The long tradition
of revealed preference theory from finite data that goes back to Afriat (1967)
is focused on testing, not estimation. The closest work to ours is Mas-Colell
(1978), who works with finitely many observations from a demand function
over a finite number of goods. Mas-Colell assumes a rational demand function
that satisfies a boundary condition and is “income Lipschitzian.” He assumes
a sufficiently rich sequence of observations, taken from an increasing sequence
of budgets. He then shows that the sequence of rationalizing preferences, each
rationalizing a finite (but increasing) set of observations, converges to the
unique preference that rationalizes the demand function.
There are many differences between Mas-Colell’s exercise and ours, even if
one restricts attention to choice over bundles of finitely-many, divisible, con-
sumption goods. In particular, the difference in model primitives—demand
instead of binary comparisons—is crucial. One cannot generally use choice
from linear budgets to recreate any given binary comparison. Moreover, there
is no property analogous to the boundary and Lipschitz continuity of demand
in our framework. Indeed, as shown in Mas-Colell (1977), by means of an
example due to Lloyd Shapley, without these properties, preferences are not
identified from demand.2 In Mas-Colell’s paper, weak and strong rationaliz-
ability coincide, as he works with demand functions. In this paper, we are
particularly interested in partial observability.
Also working with demand functions, the recent stream of literature by Reny
(2015), Ku¨bler and Polemarchakis (2017) and Polemarchakis et al. (2017) pro-
vide results on the limiting behavior of finite-data utility rationalizations.
These papers focus on the convergence of certain utility constructions that
rationalize finite demand data. In contrast, our main results are about the
2Shapley’s example also appears in Rader (1972). The example poses no problem for identi-
fication in our framework of binary comparisons. It generates non-identification of demand
because two preferences have the same marginal rate of substitution at the sampled points.
With binary comparisons, the differences between two such preferences are detected.
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convergence of (any) rationalizing preferences. There are also important differ-
ences between the primitives assumed in our paper and the demand functions
assumed in these papers.
The recent paper by Gorno (2017) also looks at the identification of pref-
erences from abstract choice behavior. A clear difference between Gorno’s
exercise and ours is that we consider the limiting behavior of large, but fi-
nite, experiments. His paper deals with preference identification from a given
choice behavior on a fixed choice set. While the two papers are concerned
with related questions, the exercises are quite different and the results are not
related.
Finally, on the technical level, we use the topology on preferences introduced
by Hildenbrand (1970) and Kannai (1970), building on the work of Debreu
(1954). In our study of the mapping from utility to preference, we borrow ideas
from Mas-Colell (1974) and Border and Segal (1994). In particular, the proof
of the continuity of the “certainty equivalent” representation is analogous to
Mas-Colell’s, and we take the notion of local strictness from Border and Segal,
as well as their continuity result.
2. Model
In this section, we introduce the definitions and conventions used throughout
the paper, and present our main model. Our focus in this section is on two
classical environments; namely, consumption space and Anscombe-Aumann
acts.
2.1. Basic definitions and notational conventions. Let Xi be a set par-
tially ordered by ≥i, for i = 1, . . . , n.
3 If x, y ∈ Πni=1Xi, then x ≥ y means that
xi ≥i yi for i = 1, . . . , n; and x > y that x ≥ y and x 6= y. We write x ≫ y
when xi >i yi for i = 1, . . . , n. The order ≥ on Π
n
i=1Xi is called the product
order.4 The interval [a, b] in Πni=1Xi denotes the set {z ∈ Π
n
i=1Xi : b ≥ z ≥ a}.
An open interval (a, b) denotes the set {z ∈ Πni=1Xi : b ≫ z ≫ a}. When
Xi = R, and ≥i is the usual order on the real numbers, the above definitions
3A partial order is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric, while a strict partial order is
irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric.
4Then ≥ is a partial order, and each of > and ≫ are strict partial orders.
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constitute the familiar ordering on Rn, as well as the usual notions of intervals
and open intervals.
If A ⊆ R is a Borel set, we write ∆(A) for the set of all Borel probability
measures on A. We endow ∆(A) with the weak* topology. For x, y ∈ ∆(A), we
write x ≥FOSD y when x is larger than on y in the sense of first order stochas-
tic dominance (meaning that
∫
A
fdx ≥
∫
A
fdy for all monotone increasing,
continuous and bounded functions f on A). When Ω is a finite set, we shall
use the above definitions to order ∆(A)Ω by the product order defined from
ordering ∆(A) by first-order stochastic dominance.
For an integer n, [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. So ∆([n]) = {x ∈ Rn+ :∑n
i=1 xi = 1} is the simplex in R
n.
2.1.1. Preference relations. Let X be a set. Given a binary relation R ⊆
X×X , we write x R y when (x, y) ∈ R. And we say that a function u : X → R
represents R if x R y iff u(x) ≥ u(y). A preference, or preference relation, is a
weak order; i.e. a binary relation over X which is complete and transitive..
For a partial order ≥ on X , a preference  on X is weakly monotone (with
respect to ≥) if x ≥ y implies that x  y. For a strict partial order > on X ,
a preference  on X is strictly monotone (with respect to >) if x > y implies
that x ≻ y.5
A binary relation R is continuous if R ⊆ X ×X is closed (see, for example,
Bergstrom et al., 1976).
The set of continuous binary relations overX , when X is a topological space,
is endowed with the topology of closed convergence, we provide a definition in
Section 5.1. It is the natural topology for our purposes because it is the weakest
topology for which optimal behavior is continuous.
Under the assumptions of our paper, the topology of closed convergence is
the smallest topology for which the sets
{(x, y,) : x ≻ y}
are open (see Kannai, 1970, Theorem 3.1). So it is the weakest topology with
the following property: Suppose that a subject with preferences  chooses x
5The strict part of a partial order is a strict partial order, but sometimes we are interested
in other partial orders. For example, ≫ is not the strict part of ≥, but we use it later.
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over y (x ≻ y), and that another subject with sufficiently close preferences
′ face a choice between x′ and y′, where (x′, y′) is sufficiently close to (x, y),
then the second subject must choose x′ over y′ (x′ ≻′ y′). In other words, the
optimal behavior according to ′ approximates the optimal behavior according
to . In this sense, the topology that we impose on preferences is natural in
any investigation of optimal choice.
2.1.2. Choice functions. A pair (Σ, c) is a choice function if Σ ⊆ 2X \ {∅} is
a collection of nonempty subsets of X , and c : Σ → 2X with ∅ 6= c(A) ⊆ A
for all A ∈ Σ. When Σ, the domain of c, is implied, we refer to c as a choice
function.
A choice function (Σ, c) is generated by a preference relation  if
c(A) = {x ∈ A : x  y for all y ∈ B},
for all A ∈ Σ.
The notation (Σ, c) means that the choice function (Σ, c) is generated by
the preference relation  on X .
2.2. The model. There is an experimenter (a female) and a subject (a male).
The subject chooses among alternatives in a set X of possible alternatives.
The subjects’ choices are guided by a preference ∗ over X , which we refer to
as data-generating preference. The experimenter seeks to infer ∗ from the
subject’s choices in a finite experiment.
In a finite experiment, the subject is presented with finitely many unordered
pairs of alternatives Bk = {xk, yk} inX . For every pair Bk, the subject is asked
to choose one of the two alternatives: xk or yk.
A sequence of experiments is a collection Σ∞ = {Bi}i∈N of pairs of possible
choices presented to the subject. Let Σk = {B1, . . . , Bk}, and let B = ∪
∞
k=1Bk
be the set of all alternatives that are used over all the experiments.
We make two assumptions on Σ∞. The first is that B is dense in X . The
second is that, for any x, y ∈ B there is k for which Bk = {x, y}. The first
assumption is obviously needed to obtain any general identification result (see
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Section 4.5). The second assumption means that the experimenter is able to
elicit the subject’s choices over all pairs used in her experiment.6
2.2.1. The data and its rationalizations. For each k, the subject’s preference
∗ generates a choice function (Σk, c∗). Thus the choice behavior observed
by the experimenter is always consistent with (Σk, c∗). We term (Σk, c∗) the
choice function of order k generated by ∗, and we term the choice function
(Σ∞, c∗) the choice sequence of order k generated by 
∗.
Sometimes, we may not be able to observe the subject’s entire choice func-
tion. In the spirit of Afriat (1967), we want to allow for the possibility that the
subject may in principle be willing to choose x, but does not actually choose
it. In the language of Chambers et al. (2014), we want to study the concept of
partial observability. To this end, a general choice function (Σ∞, c) is termed
a choice sequence and this induces, for every k, a choice function on Σk.
For a choice function c and a preference ∗, we use the notation c ⊑ c∗
to mean that for each budget Bk, c(Bk) ⊆ c∗(Bk); i.e., the observed choices
from Bk are optimal for 
∗.
In the context of partial observability, the notion of rationalization needs to
accommodate the fact that some preference maximal alternatives may not have
actually been chosen. The next concept captures such an accommodation; and
is again in the spirit of Afriat (1967).
A preference k weakly rationalizes (Σk, c) if, for all Bi ∈ Σk, c(Bi) ⊆
ck(Bi). A preference k weakly rationalizes a choice sequence (Σ∞, c) if it
rationalizes the choice function of order k (Σk, c), for all k ≥ 1.
The following concept is analogous to the notion of rationalization discussed
in Richter (1966), and is the appropriate notion when it is known that all
potentially chosen alternatives are actually chosen.
A preference k strongly rationalizes (Σk, c) if, for all Bi ∈ Σk, c(Bi) =
ck(Bi). A preference k strongly rationalizes a choice sequence (Σ∞, c) if it
rationalizes the choice function of order k (Σk, c), for all k ≥ 1.
6If there is a countable dense A ⊆ X , then one can always construct such a sequence of
experiments via a standard diagonalization argument.
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3. Results
3.1. Motivation. Many results on identification in economics presume access
to rich information. In decision theory, the presumption is that one can observe
enough of the subject’s choices so as to effectively know the subject’s preference
∗. In this section, we point to some problems with this assumption.
Let I= X ×X denote the degenerate preference relation that regards any
two alternatives as indifferent.
Proposition 1. Let X = [a, b] ⊆ Rn, where a ≪ b. Let the subject’s prefer-
ence ∗ be continuous. There exists a continuous preference k that strongly
rationalizes the choice function of order k generated by ∗, and such that
k→
I .
The proof of Proposition 1 is relegated to Appendix B.
Proposition 1 means that, absent further conditions, the sequence of ra-
tionalizations can be very different from the preference ∗ generating the
subject’s choices. It is possible to choose rationalizations that converge to
full indifference among all alternatives, regardless of which ∗ really gener-
ated the subject’s choices. The objective of our paper is to show how such
problems can be avoided.
Proposition 1 suggests another distinction. There is “infinite data” in the
form of the data-generating preference ∗, such data is commonly assumed
in decision theory; there is finite data, in the form of (Σk, c
∗
); and, “limiting
data,” which would be ∗ |B, i.e., the preference 
∗ restricted to domain
B. With limiting data one would be able to identify ∗. Indeed, we show in
Section 3.5 that if  |B =
∗ |B then =
∗.
Therefore, Proposition 1 illustrates a sort of discontinuity. If one only had
access to limiting data, there would be no problem. However, with arbitrarily
large, but finite, data, preference rationalizations can be completely wrong.
3.2. Weak rationalizations. We now present a series of simple sufficient
conditions ensuring convergence of preference rationalizations to the subject’s
preference. The results are discussed in Section 4.
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Let X = Rn+. Recall that the strict partial order ≫ on R
n
+ refers to the
relation x≫ y if for each i, xi > yi (i.e. the product of >); strict monotonicity
refers to this relation.
Theorem 2. Let the subject’s preference ∗ be continuous and strictly mono-
tone. Suppose that c ⊑ c∗. For each k ∈ N, let k be a continuous and
strictly monotone preference that weakly rationalizes (Σk, c). Then, k→
∗.
Theorem 2 can be generalized, as ∗ and k do not need to be transitive.
They only need to be continuous, strictly monotone, and complete.
3.3. Strong rationalization. Suppose that X is either
(1) Rn+,
(2) or ∆([a, b])Ω for a finite set Ω and [a, b] ⊆ R.
Recall that we topologize ∆([a, b]) with its weak* topology, and ∆([a, b])Ω
with the product topology. In the case of Rn+, the relation ≥ refers to the
product of ≥ on each of the coordinates, and on ∆([a, b])Ω, it is the product
of ≥FOSD.
Theorem 3. Let the subject’s preference ∗ be weakly monotone. For each
k ∈ N, let k be a continuous and weakly monotone preference that strongly
rationalizes the choice function of order k generated by ∗. Then, k→
∗.
3.4. Utility functions. Let X be either of the sets in Section 3.3. In the case
of ∆([a, b])Ω, > references the strict part of ≥ as defined previously.
Denote by Rmon the set of preferences that are strictly monotone and con-
tinuous, and by U the set of strictly increasing and continuous utility functions
on X . The set U is endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on com-
pacta.
Let Φ be the function that carries each utility function in U into the pref-
erence relation that it represents. So Φ : U → Rmon is such that x Φ(u) y if
and only if u(x) ≥ u(y).
We regard two utility functions as equivalent if they represent the same
preference: if they are ordinally equivalent. Define an equivalence relation ≃
on U by u ≃ v if there exists ϕ : R→ R strictly increasing for which u = ϕ◦v.
Then let U/ ≃ denote the set of equivalence classes of U under ≃ endowed with
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the quotient topology. The function Φˆ : U/ ≃→ Rmon maps an equivalence
class into Φ(u), for any u member of the equivalence class.
Theorem 4. Φˆ is a homeomorphism.
Theorem 4 implies that a utility representation may be chosen from a finite-
experiment rationalization so as to approximate a given utility representation
for the preference generating the choices.
The following Proposition adds some structure to Theorem 4. It claims a
lower hemicontinuity result for Φ−1, in the sense that for any utility represen-
tation of a strictly monotone preference, a convergent sequence of preferences
possesses a convergent sequence of utility representations.
Proposition 5. Let the subject’s preference ∗ be strictly monotone and con-
tinuous. Let k be a continuous and strictly monotone preference that strongly
rationalizes the choice function of order k generated by ∗. Then, for any util-
ity representation u∗ of ∗, there exist utility representations uk of k such
that uk → u
∗.
3.5. Limiting data. Let X be as in Section 3.3, and let B be the dense set
of alternatives used over all experiments.
Theorem 6. Suppose that  and ∗ are two continuous preference relations.
If  |B×B =
∗ |B×B, then =
∗.
As we discussed in Section 3.1, the case of limiting data serves to illustrate
the difference between a sequence of finite experiment and the limit of a count-
ably infinite dataset. Theorem 6 means that one can obtain identification of
∗ solely from the continuity assumption (we refer the reader to Section 8 for
more details).
4. Discussion
4.1. Positive results and assumptions on X. The previous section as-
sumes that X is either Rn+ or ∆([a, b])
Ω, for some finite set Ω. The point
of Theorems 2 and 3 is to provide a positive result in response to the con-
cerns raised in Section 3.1. The results cover some of the most widely used
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choice spaces in economics: Rn+ is consumption space in demand theory, and
∆([a, b])Ω is a space of Anscombe-Aumann acts over monetary lotteries.
For the Anscombe-Aumann interpretation, let Ω be a finite nonempty set
of states of the world, and interpret [a, b] as a set of monetary payoffs. The
elements of ∆([a, b]) are lotteries of monetary payoffs. An Anscombe-Aumann
act is a state-contingent monetary lottery; it maps elements from Ω to ∆([a, b]).
The set of alternatives ∆([a, b])Ω is then the set all Anscombe-Aumann acts.
The spaces Rn+ and ∆([a, b])
Ω have in common that there is an objective
notion of monotonicity that preferences can be made to conform to. Other
spaces share this property. Section 5 includes our most general results.
4.2. Identification of utility functions. Many results on identification in
decision theory can be phrased in the following terms. There are subsets
U ′ ⊆ U and R′ ⊆ Rmon, and an equivalence relation ≃′ on U ′ such that Φ is
a bijection from U ′/ ≃′ onto R′. The idea is that, with data in the form of
∗, one can uniquely “back out” an equivalence class from U ′.
Our results suggest that this is not enough when data is finite. First, one
needs to ensure that rationalizations obtained from finite data converge to
the underlying ∗. Second, the space of preferences and utilities have to be
homeomorphic in order to be able to obtain a limiting utility function from a
large, but finite, dataset on choices.
4.3. Partial observability. The distinction between weak and strong ratio-
nalizability is important. In fact, it is rather surprising that one can obtain a
result such as Theorem 2 for weak rationalizations.
A choice sequence generated by the subject’s preference reflects both strict
comparisons as well as indifferences. In practice, however, the experimenter
may not be able to properly infer the indifference of the subject regarding
two alternatives. The difficulty arises, for example, when the experimenter
offers the subject his preferred alternative. In this case, the experimenter
would typically require that the subject selects only one of the two alternatives
presented to him. Such situations, in which the experimenter cannot commit
to being able to see all potentially chosen elements, are referred to partial
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observability (Chambers et al., 2014), in contrast to full observability in which
the experimenter is able to elicit the subject’s indifference between alternatives.
Weak rationalizability expresses the idea that the experimenter is not willing
to commit to interpreting observed choices as the only potential choices made
by the subject. For example, if the experimenter observes that the subject
chooses x when presented the pair {x, y}, she may not be willing to infer that
x ≻∗ y, as it may be that x ∼∗ y but the subject simply did not choose
y. This notion of weak rationalization is used, for example, by Afriat (1967)
in the context of consumer theory (for more details on this notion, see, for
example, Chambers and Echenique (2016)).7
Weak rationalizability is partially agnostic with respect to the status of
unchosen alternatives, so it is surprising that one can ensure convergence of
preference rationalizations to the preference that generated the choices.
4.4. Monotone Preferences. The problem exemplified by Proposition 1 is
that one cannot hope to obtain convergence to ∗ if there is no discipline
placed on the rationalizing preferences. In a sense, we need to constrain, or
structure, the theory from which rationalizations are drawn. Our results show
that a notion of objective monotonicity is enough to ensure that rationalizing
preferences in the limit approach the subject’s preferences.
As discussed in the introduction, and exemplified by Proposition 1, the
continuity assumption on the subject’s preference, and the assumption that the
alternatives offered are in the limit dense, do not generally ensure convergence
to the subject’s preference. Proposition 1 shows that the failure of convergence
can be rather dramatic. We must impose structure on the subject’s preference,
and on the finite-experiment rationalizations.
Observe that the preferences k constructed in Proposition 1 cannot be
monotone. Suppose that ∗ is a continuous preference relation, and suppose
that x ≻∗ y. In the construction in Proposition 1 we obtain a sequence of
rationalizations k such that in the limit y is at least as good as x. This cannot
happen if each rationalizing preference is weakly monotone: x ≻∗ y implies
7Analogously, the hypothesis of full observability, related to what we call strong rationaliza-
tion, is the notion employed by Richter (1966). A recent work showing how to obtain both
types of conditions as a special case is Nishimura et al. (2017).
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that x′ ≻∗ y′ for (x′, y′) close enough to (x, y). Thanks to the interaction of
the order and the topology on Rn we can find a k large enough such that there
are {x′′, y′′} ∈ Σk (meaning alternatives offered in the kth finite experiment)
with x′ ≥ x′′ and y′′ ≥ y′, and where (x′′, y′′) is also close to (x, y). If k is
monotone then we have x′ k x
′′ and y′′  y′. But if k strongly rationalizes
the choices made at the kth experiment, then x′′ ≻k y
′′. So we have to have
x′ ≻k y
′ for any (x′, y′) close enough to (x, y).
4.5. On the denseness of B. We assume that B, the set of all alterna-
tives used in a sequence of experiments, is dense. Our paper deals with fully
nonparametric identification, so it seems impossible to obtain a general result
without assuming denseness of B: imagine that the experimenter leaves an
open set of alternatives outside of her experimental design. Then the subject’s
preferences over alternatives in that set would be very hard to gauge.
In practice, one can imagine restricting attention to smaller class of fami-
lies for which one does not need to elicit choices over a set that is dense in
X . For example for expected utility preferences over lotteries, or homothetic
preferences in Rn, one is only trying to infer a single indifference curve. So a
smaller set of choices is enough: but even in that case one would need the set
of alternatives in the limit to be dense in the smaller set of choices.
4.6. Preference identification and utility identification. The theorems
say, roughly speaking, that, if we assume data generated by a (well behaved)
preference ∗, then any “finite sample rationalization” k is guaranteed to
converge to the generating preference. So estimates have the correct “large
sample” properties. In particular, one may be interested in a specific theory
of choice, such as max-min or Choquet expected utility. If the subject’s ∗
is max-min, or Choquet, one can choose rationalizing preferences to conform
to the theory, and the limit will uniquely identify the subject’s max-min, or
Choquet, preference. But if one incorrectly uses rationalizing preferences out-
side of the theory, the asymptotic behavior will still correct the problem, and
uniquely identify ∗ in the limit. The theorems also say that there are certain
utility representations uk that will be correct asymptotically.
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Note, however, what the theorems do not say. First, the estimates k are
guaranteed to converge to the generating preferences ∗, when the generating
preference is known to exist. If one simply estimates the preferences k, these
may fail to converge to a well-behaved preference. We present two examples to
this effect in Section 9. That said, under certain conditions (that unfortunately
are not satisfied in the Anscombe-Aumann setting), the “size” of the set of
rationalizing preferences shrinks as k growth; see Theorem 10.
Second, our results do not say that one can choose uk arbitrarily. Any
estimated rationalizing preference will converge to the preferences rationalizing
the utility, but basing the estimation on utilities is more complicated because
it is not clear that any utility representation of ∗ will have the right limit, or
even converge at all.
5. General Results
In Section 3, we have presented our main results for some important special
cases of the collection of alternatives X . In this section, we present our main
results for the general case. We now assume that X is a Polish and locally
compact space, and provide conditions under which our convergence results
continue to hold. The conditions we provide are the weakest we know. The
section concludes with applications to this general case. Note that this section
focuses on preference identification, general results for utility identification are
given in Section 6.
5.1. Convergence of Preferences. To speak about the approximation of the
subject’s preference, one must introduce a notion of convergence on the space
of preferences. We use closed convergence, and endow the space of preference
relations with the associated topology. The use of closed convergence for pref-
erence relations was initiated by the work of Kannai (1970) and Hildenbrand
(1970), and has become standard since then.
One primary reason to adopt closed convergence is to capture the property
that agents with similar preferences should have similar choice behavior—a
property that is necessary to be able to learn the preference from finite data.
Specifically, under the assumptions we use for most of our results, the topology
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of closed convergence is the smallest topology for which the sets
{(x, y,) : x ≻ y}
are open (see Kannai (1970) Theorem 3.1). The desired continuity of choice
behavior is expressed by the fact that sets of the form {(x, y,) : x ≻ y} are
open. The topology of closed convergence being the smallest topology with
this property is a natural reason for adopting it.
The following characterization of closed convergence for the context of pref-
erence relations will be used throughout the paper:
Lemma 7. Let n be a sequence of preference relations, and let  be a pref-
erence relation. Then n→ in the topology of closed convergence if and only
if, for all x, y ∈ X,
(1) x  y implies that for any neighborhood V of (x, y) in X ×X there is
N such that for all n ≥ N , n ∩V 6= ∅;
(2) if, for any neighborhood V of (x, y) in X × X, and any N there is
n ≥ N with n ∩V 6= ∅, then x  y.
The following lemma plays an important role in the approximation results.
Lemma 8. The set of all continuous binary relations on X, endowed with the
topology of closed convergence, is a compact metrizable space.
Proof. See Theorem 2 (Chapter B) of Hildenbrand (2015), or Corollary 3.95
of Aliprantis and Border (2006). 
In particular, we shall denote the metric which generates the closed conver-
gence topology by δC . Recall that X is metrizable. Let d be an associated
metric. When X is compact, one can choose δC to be the Hausdorff metric on
subsets of X ×X induced by d. On the other hand, if X is only locally com-
pact, then δC may be chosen to coincide with the Hausdorff metric on subsets
of X∞ ×X∞, where X∞ is the one-point compactification of X together with
some metric generating X∞. See Aliprantis and Border (2006) for details.
5.2. Weak rationalizations. We now present our results on the asymptotic
behavior of preference estimates based on finite data. The results generalize
those stated in Section 3.
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For our first result, we must define two notions. We say that a preference
relation  is locally strict if for every x, y ∈ X with x  y, and every neigh-
borhood V of (x, y) in X ×X there is (x′, y′) ∈ V with x′ ≻ y′.
The first main result gives conditions of convergence of preferences that
weakly rationalize the experimental observations. Note that Theorem 9 gen-
eralizes Theorem 2.
Theorem 9. Suppose that
(1) the subject’s preference ∗ is continuous and strictly monotone,
(2) the strict partial order < is an open set,
(3) every continuous and strictly monotone preference relation is locally
strict.
Let c ⊑ c∗ be a choice sequence, and let k be a continuous and strictly
monotone preference that weakly rationalizes ck. Then, k→
∗ in the closed
convergence topology.
Note that the assumption that ∗ and k are transitive is not needed.
Instead, each of these only needs to be continuous, strictly monotone, and
complete.
Note that Theorem 9 requires the existence of the data-generating preference
∗. However, even if existence of this object is not supposed, we can still
“bound” the set of rationalizations to an arbitrary degree of precision. This is
the point of the next result.
For a choice sequence c, let Pk(c) be the set of continuous and strictly
monotone preferences that weakly rationalize ck. For a set of binary relations
S, define diam(S) = sup(,′)∈S2 δC(,
′) to be the diameter of S according
to the metric δC which generates the topology on preferences.
Theorem 10. Suppose that < has open intervals. Let c be a choice sequence,
and suppose that each strictly monotone continuous preference is also locally
strict. Then one of the following holds:
(1) There is k such that Pk(c) = ∅.
(2) limk→∞ diam(P
k(c))→ 0.
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That is, either a choice sequence is eventually not weakly rationalizable by a
strictly monotone preference, or, the set of rationalizations becomes arbitrarily
small.
Note that, as for Theorem 9, Theorem 10 can dispense with the notion of
transitivity. In this case, we would define Pk(c) to be the set of (potentially
nontransitive) complete, continuous, and strongly monotone relations weakly
rationalizing ck.
5.3. Strong rationalizations. Say that the set X , together with the col-
lection of finite experiments Σ∞, has the countable order property if for each
x ∈ X and each neighborhood V of x in X there is x′, x′′ ∈ B ∩ V with
x′ ≤ x ≤ x′′. We say that X has the squeezing property if for any conver-
gent sequence {xn}n in X , if xn → x
∗ then there is an increasing sequence
{x′n}n, and an a decreasing sequence {x
′′
n}n, such that x
′
n ≤ xn ≤ x
′′
n, and
limn→∞ x
′
n = x
∗ = limn→∞ x
′′
n.
Theorem 11. Suppose that
(1) the subject’s preference ∗ is weakly monotone,
(2) (X,Σ∞) has the countable order property, and X the squeezing prop-
erty.
Let k be a continuous and weakly monotone preference that strongly ratio-
nalizes the choice function of order k generated by ∗. Then, k→
∗ in the
closed convergence topology.
The countable order and squeezing properties are technical but not vacu-
ous. Importantly, as stated below in Proposition 12, they are satisfied for
two common cases of interest discussed in Section 3.3. Therefore, Theorem 11
generalizes Theorem 3.
Proposition 12. If either
(1) the set of alternatives X is Rn endowed with the order of weak vector
dominance, or
(2) the set of alternatives X is ∆([a, b]) endowed with the order of weak
first-order stochastic dominance,
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then X has the squeezing property, and there is Σ∞ such that (X,Σ∞) has the
countable order property.
One key element behind the above two results is a natural order on the sets
of possible alternatives. Via monotonicity, the order adds structure to the
families of preferences under consideration. Crucially, the order also relates to
the topology on the set X .
5.4. Applications. We have already highlighted the application of our results
to Euclidean consumption spaces and Anscombe-Aumann acts over monetary
lotteries (see Section 3). Here we discuss two other domains of application of
our results.
5.4.1. Lotteries over a finite prize space. Let Π be a finite prize space. The
objects of choice are the elements of X = ∆(Π). Fix a strict ranking of the
elements of Π, and enumerate the elements of Π so that pi1 is ranked above
pi2, which is ranked above pi3, and so on. Then the elements of X can be
ordered with respect to first-order stochastic dominance: x is larger than y in
this order if the probability of each set {pi1, . . . , pik} is at least as large under
x than under y, for all k = 1, . . . , |Π|. A preference over X is monotone if it
always prefer larger lotteries over smaller ones.8
Suppose that choices are generated by an expected utility preference ∗.
The fact that ∗ belongs to the expected utility family implies that there
are rationalizing expected utility preference k, for each finite experiment k.
Then, the above results ensure that these converge to ∗. Of course the same
would be true of any (monotone and continuous) rationalizing preference: any
mode mis-specification would be corrected in the limit. In other words, any
arbitrary sequence of rationalization has the data-generating preference ∗ as
its limit.
5.4.2. Dated rewards. We can apply our theory to intertemporal choice. Specif-
ically to the choice of dated rewards (Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)). The
set of elements of choice is R2+. A point (x, t) ∈ R
2
+ is interpreted as a mone-
tary payment of x delivered on date t. Endow R2+ with the order ≤
i whereby
8The objective order on Π is not really needed in this case; see Example 19. The point of
the example is to illustrate Theorem 9.
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(x, t) ≤i (x′, t′) if x ≤ x′ and t′ ≤ t. Monotonicity of preferences means that
more money earlier is preferred to less money later.
Now one can postulate a preference ∗ such that (x′, t′) ∗ (x, t) iff δtv(x) ≤
δt
′
v(x′), for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and a strictly increasing function v : R+ → R.
This means that ∗ follows the exponential discounting model. Again, any
finite experiment would be rationalizable by exponential preference, and these
would converge to the limiting ∗.
6. Identification of Utility Functions
In this section, we investigate the relation between preferences and util-
ity. Preferences remain topologized with the closed convergence topology. We
study continuous utility representations, and ask when the identification of a
preference allows the identification of a utility (or conversely). We show that if
we endow the set of continuous utility functions with the topology of uniform
convergence on compacta, then convergence in one sense is equivalent to con-
vergence in the other. Formally, we establish that there is a homeomorphism
between the two spaces (when we identify two utility functions representing
the same preference relation).
Throughout this section, the space of possible alternatives X is connected
(and remains a locally compact Polish space, as described in our model). Con-
nectedness is imposed so that every continuous preference admits a continuous
representation, as in Debreu (1954).
We denote by U the set of strictly increasing and continuous utility func-
tions on X . Similarly, Rmon denotes the set of preferences which are strictly
monotone and continuous.
Suppose the existence of a set M ⊆ X , satisfying the following conditions:
• M has at least two distinct elements; M is connected and totally or-
dered by <. In other words x, y ∈ M and x 6= y implies x < y or
y < x.
• For any m ∈M and any neighborhood U ofm in X there ism,m ∈M ,
with
m ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U.
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Moreover if m is not the largest element of M we can choose m such
that m < m, and if m is not the smallest element we can choose m
such that m < m.
• Any bounded sequence in X is bounded by elements of M . That is,
for any bounded sequence {xn} there are m and m and k large so that
m ≤ xn ≤ m.
Let Φ : U → Rmon such that Φ(u) is the preference represented by u ∈ U .9
We provide two examples below that demonstrate the property just men-
tioned for the case of alternatives of the formX = ∆([a, b]) andX = ∆([a, b])n.
Example 13. Let X = ∆([a, b]) be the set of Borel probability distributions
on a real compact interval S = [a, b] ⊆ R. Endow X with the weak* topology
and let ≤ be first-order stochastic dominance. Observe that X is compact,
metrizable, and separable (Theorems 15.11 and 15.12 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)). Observe also that X has the countable order property (see Lemma 28
in Appendix C).
Let < be the strict part of ≤. Identify S with degenerate probability distri-
butions, so that s ∈ S denotes the element of X that assigns probability 1 to
{s}, say δs. Let M = S. The relative topology on S coincides with the usual
topology, so S is connected. Note that a ≤ x ≤ b for any x ∈ X .
Let m ∈ M and U be a neighborhood of m in X . For each x ∈ X , let F x
be the cdf associated to x. Choose ε such that the ball Bε(m) (in the Levy
metric) with center m and radius ε is contained in U . Let ε′ < ε. Then if
y ∈ [m− ε′, m+ ε′] we have that
F y(s− ε)− ε ≤ Fm−ε
′
(s− ε)− ε < 1 = Fm(s) if s− ε ≥ m− ε′
F y(s− ε)− ε ≤ Fm−ε
′
(s− ε)− ε = −ε < Fm(s) if s− ε < m− ε′
Similarly,
Fm(s) = 0 < Fm+ε(s+ ε) + ε ≤ F y(s+ ε) + ε if s+ ε ≤ m+ ε′
Fm(s) < 1 + ε = Fm+ε
′
(s+ ε) + ε ≤ F y(s+ ε) + ε if s+ ε > m+ ε′.
9That is, x Φ(u) y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y).
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These inequalities mean that y ∈ Bε(m). Thus [m− ε
′, m+ ε′] ⊆ U , as y was
arbitrary.
Example 14. Let Ω be a nonempty set such that |Ω| < +∞. Suppose Ω
represents a set of states of the world. Then ∆([a, b])Ω, endowed with the
product weak* topology, and ordered by the product order, of Ω copies of first
order stochastic dominance, represents the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts,
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Let S = {(δs, . . . , δs) : s ∈ [a, b]}; the con-
stant acts whose outcomes are degenerate lotteries. Let M = S, as in the
previous example; and all topological properties satisfied there are also satis-
fied here.
The following results generalize those derived originally by Mas-Colell (1974),
who worked with Rn+.
Theorem 15. Φ is an open map.
Theorem 16. (Border and Segal (1994) Thm 8) Let (X, d) be a locally com-
pact and separable metric space and R be the space of continuous preference
relations on X, endowed with the topology of closed convergence. If u= Φ(u)
is locally strict, then Φ is continuous at u. If M has no isolated points, and Φ
is continuous at u, then u is locally strict.
Define an equivalence relation ≃ on U by u ≃ v if there exists ϕ : R → R
strictly increasing for which u = ϕ ◦ v. Then let U/ ≃ denote the set of
equivalence classes of U under ≃ endowed with the quotient topology; the
equivalence class of u ∈ U is written [u]. The map Φˆ : U/ ≃→ Rmon is
defined in the natural way, via Φˆ([u]) = Φ(u).10
Theorem 17. Φˆ is a homeomorphism.
Given the discussion of Example 13, Theorem 17 generalizes Theorem 4.
The role of M in the case of Rn+ is played by the equal-coordinates ray. It
is also straightforward to apply Theorem 17 to intertemporal choice by way
of the model of dated rewards (see Section 5.4.2, by letting M be the line
{(x, 0) : x ≥ 0}.
10Observe that this function is well-defined. If v ∈ [u], then there is strictly increasing ϕ for
which v = ϕ ◦ u, hence v and u represent the same preference.
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7. Non-monotone preferences and local strictness
When the set of utility functions is compact, we can obtain a particularly
strong result that does not rely on monotonicity, or the existence of a preference
relation generating the choices. Instead, the generating preference is obtained
endogenously as the limit of rationalizing preferences.11
Let V be a compact set of continuous functions in the topology of compact
convergence, and let Φ(V) denote the image of V under Φ, so that Φ(u) is the
preference represented by u.
Theorem 18. Suppose V is compact, and that all ∈ Φ(V) are locally strict.
Let c be a choice sequence, and let k∈ V weakly rationalize c
k. Then, there
exists ∗∈ Φ(V) such that k→
∗ in the closed convergence topology. Fur-
thermore, if ′k also weakly rationalizes c
k, then ′k→
∗.
Observe that knowledge of a generating preference ∗ is not required; but
the hypothesis that there is a weak rationalization k for every c
k suggests
the possibility.
Theorem 18 implies that one can sometimes obtain asymptotically utility
rationalizations drawn from V. In particular, when V is compact, Φ(V) consists
of locally strict preferences, and Φ is a homeomorphism then Φ−1(k) ∈ V
converges to a utility for∗ in V. One application of this kind is in Example 19.
Example 19. Let X be a finite set, and let ∆(X) be the lotteries on X
(topologized as elements of Euclidean space). Consider the set of nonconstant
expected utility preferences. Then the hypotheses of Theorem 18 hold here.
To see this, observe that the set of nonconstant von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility indices is homeomorphic to the set
S = {u ∈ RX :
∑
x
ux = 0, ‖u‖ = 1}.
It is straightforward to see that the map φ : S → C(∆(X)) given by φ(u)(p) =
∑
x uxp(x) is continuous. So, let V = φ(S) which is compact; then the set
Φ(V) is the set of nontrivial expected utility preferences. Finally, observe
that each nonconstant expected utility preference is locally strict. For, if  is
11In particular, these results should be contrasted with the example in Section 9.1.
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nonconstant, then there are p, q ∈ ∆(X) for which p ≻ q. Then for any r  s,
for any α > 0, αp + (1 − α)r ≻ αq + (1 − α)s. Choose α small to be within
any neighborhood of (r, s).
Next, Example 20 allows for an infinite set of prices, but restricts von
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities to have lower and upper Lipschitz bounds.
Example 20. We can consider Rn+, and a class of utility functions U
b
a, where
a, b ∈ R with 0 < a < b.
U ba = {u ∈ C(R
n
+) : ∀i∧∀(xi < yi), a(yi−xi) ≤ u(yi, x−i)−u(xi, x−i) ≤ b(yi−xi)}.
Observe that U ba ⊆ U , and consists of those members satisfying a certain
Lipschitz property (namely, Lipschitz boundedness above and below). By the
Arzela-Ascoli Theorem (see Dugundji (1966), Theorem 6.4), U ba is compact.
Furthermore, each ∈ Φ(U ba) is locally strict, as it is strictly monotonic.
8. Infinite and Countable Data
In this section, we propose two sufficient conditions that enable the recovery
of the subject’s preference from its restriction to a countable set of data points.
We first show below that if we can observe a subrelation of a locally strict
and continuous binary relation on a dense set, then we can infer the entire
binary relation.
Theorem 21. Suppose that  and ′ are two complete, continuous, and lo-
cally strict binary relations. Let B ⊆ X be dense. If  |B×B ⊆
′ |B×B, then
=′.
We then make no restriction on the preferences other than continuity, but
requires the underlying space of alternatives to be connected.
Theorem 22. Suppose that  and ′ are two continuous preference relations.
Suppose X is connected, and let B ⊆ X be dense. If  |B×B =
′ |B×B, then
=′.
Note that Theorem 22 generalizes Theorem 6. Without connectedness, this
result can fail. A preference  can be increasing on (0, 1) ∪ (2, 3), but there
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are two possible ways to extend it to [0, 1] ∪ [2, 3]; either by setting 1 ∼ 2, or
2 ≻ 1.
A classical procedure, attributed to Allais (see Allais, 1953) allows one to
elicit multiple choices with one suitably randomized choice. Roughly, one uses
a randomization device whose outcome is a choice set, and asks a subject to
announce what she would choose ex-ante from each of the sets in the support in
the distribution. A decision maker who respects basic monotonicity postulates
(see Azrieli et al., 2014) correctly announces each of their choices.
If we can uncover an entire preference from each of these choices, then
we are able to elicit an entire preference using one suitably chosen random
device. Here, we do not investigate this theory in its full generality. But if
there is a countable dense subset of alternatives, and a continuous preference
can be inferred from its behavior on a countable dense subset, then we can
utilize the Allais mechanism to uncover an entire preference with a single
randomized choice. For example, we would enumerate the pairs of elements
from the countable dense subset, say B1, B2, . . ., and randomize so that each
one realizes with probability 2−k.
9. On the meaning of ∗
Some economists are comfortable with the idea that an agent “has” a data-
generating preference ∗, and some are not. The former assume that the
preference is something intrinsic to the agent, and that when presented with
a choice situation the agent can access his preference and choose accordingly.
Under this interpretation, our paper gives conditions under which a finite ex-
periment can approximate, to an arbitrary degree of precision, the underlying
preference that the agent uses to make choices.
Other economists argue that preferences are just choices. For those in this
position, it is meaningless to speak of a preference over pairs of alternatives
from which the agent never chooses. We are sympathetic to this view, and
our paper also contributes to this interpretation. Under proper conditions—
conditions that we provide in our paper—continuity “defines” preferences over
X given choices over a countable subset. This is important because estimated
preferences provide a guide for making normative recommendations and out
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of sample predictions. An economist may want to estimate ∗ so as to make
policy recommendations that are in the agent’s interest; in fact, this is a
common use of estimated preferences in applied work. Similarly, the economist
may want to use ∗ as an input in a structural economic model, and thereby
make predictions for different configurations of the model. The existence and
meaning of ∗ is then provided for by the continuity assumption.
Moreover, viewed from this angle, Theorem 10 allows us to say that the set
of rationalizations can be made arbitrarily small as more and more data are
observed.12 In this manner, one can bound errors in welfare statements or out
of sample predictions to an arbitrary degree of precision.
We conclude this section with two examples that illustrate the importance
of postulating existence of an agent’s preference: without the postulate, the
inferred preference may otherwise fail to converge.
9.1. The set of weakly monotone preference relations is not closed.
Suppose we are interested in rationality in the form of a strictly monotonic
continuous preference relation. Observe that Theorems 9 and 11 hypothesize
the existence of ∗. If ∗∈ Rmon, for example, then we know that, in the
limit, rationalizing relations will be transitive if every k is. Unfortunately, we
show in this section, if we do not know that ∗ is transitive, we cannot ensure
that it is, even if each k is. That is, we demonstrate a sequence k of strictly
monotone preferences, where k→
∗ in the closed convergence topology, but
∗ is not transitive.
The data are rationalizable, but the rationalization requires intransitive in-
difference. So the properties of the rationalizations of order k cannot be pre-
served.
Figure 1 exhibits a non-transitive relation. The example is taken from
Grodal (1974). The lines depict indifference curves, but all the green indif-
ference curves intersect at one point: (1/2, 1/2). This makes the preference
non-transitive; specifically the indifference part of the preference would be
intransitive here.
12This is true in spite of the claim we make in Section 9.1. It is true that the set of
rationalizations may “shrink” to something which is not transitive, but this set is shrinking
nonetheless and always contains preference relations (except in the limit).
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1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Figure 1. A non-transitive preference
Now imagine a collection of binary comparisons that do not include (1/2, 1/2).
Suppose that this collection is the limit of a finite number of binary compar-
isons, making it at most countable. There must exist a ball around (1/2, 1/2)
that does not include any of the comparisons. Consider the diagram in Fig-
ure 2. The preferences have been modified close to (1/2, 1/2) so that transi-
tivity holds.
This example is not particularly troubling, however. First, with finite exper-
imentation, the violation of transitivity will never be “reached.” Second, the
violation here is not particularly egregious. Only transitivity of indifference is
violated. This holds quite generally. It can be shown that any limit point of
a sequence of preference relations must be quasitransitive, so that whenever
x ≻ y and y ≻ z, it follows that x ≻ z.13 Quasitransitive relations enjoy many
of the useful properties of preferences. For example, continuous quasitransitive
relations possess maxima on compact sets, see e.g. Bergstrom (1975).
13The argument is in Grodal (1974), but to see this suppose that n→, where each n
is a preference relation. It can be shown that  is complete, so suppose by means of
contradiction that there are x, y, z ∈ X for which x ≻ y, y ≻ z, and z  x. So, there are
xn, zn for which zn n xn, xn → x, and zn → z. For each n, either zn n y or y n x, so
that without loss, there is a sequence for which zn n y, i.e. z  y, a contradiction.
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Figure 2. A transitive preference
9.2. The set of locally strict relations is not closed. Finally we present
an example to show that the set of locally strict preference relations is not
closed. Let X = [−3,−1] ∪ [1, 3]. For each n, let un(x) = −(x + 2)
2 + 1
n
on
[−3,−1] and un(x) = (x − 2)
2 − 1
n
on [1, 3]. See Figure 3. The function un
represents a locally strict relation n.
Let u∗(x) be the pointwise limit of un; i.e. u
∗(x) = −(x + 2)2 on [−3,−1]
and u∗(x) = (x − 2)2 on [1, 3]. The function u∗ represents ∗ which is not
locally strict. Observe that −2 ∗ 2, but for small neighborhoods there is no
strict preference.
However, it is also straightforward by checking cases to show that n→
∗.
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Figure 3. The set of locally strict preferences is not closed.
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Appendix A. About Closed Convergence
We recall below the formal definition of closed convergence, used throughout
the results of this paper. Let F = {F n}n be a sequence of closed sets in X×X .
We define Li(F) and Ls(F) to be closed subsets of X ×X as follows:
• (x, y) ∈ Li(F) if and only if, for all neighborhood V of (x, y), there
exists N ∈ N such that F n ∩ V 6= ∅ for all n ≥ N .
• (x, y) ∈ Ls(F) if and only if, for all neighborhood V of (x, y), and all
N ∈ N, there is n ≥ N such that F n ∩ V 6= ∅.
Observe that Li(F) ⊆ Ls(F). The definition of closed convergence is as follows.
Definition 23. F n converges to F in the topology of closed convergence if
Li(F) = F = Ls(F).
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Denote by (a′, b′) the open interval {z ∈ Rn : a′ ≪ z ≪ b′}. For each k, let
uk : ∪
k
l=1Bl → [0, 1] be a utility representation of 
∗ on ∪kl=1Bl.
For each k, let {[ai, bi]}
nk
i=1 be a sequence of intervals in R
n with the prop-
erties that a) [a, b] ⊆ ∪nki=1[ai, bi], b) (ai, bi) ∩ (aj , bj) = ∅ for i 6= j, c) each
element of ∪kl=1Bl is contained in a set (ai, bi), and no two elements of ∪
k
l=1Bl
are contained in the same, and d) [ai, bi] is contained in some ball of radius
(2k)−1.14
For each interval [ai, bi] there is a continuous function fi such that f(x) = 0
for all x ∈ [ai, bi] \ (ai, bi), f(x) = uk(x) if x ∈ (ai, bi) ∩ ∪
k
l=1Bl, sup{f(x) :
x ∈ [ai, bi]} = 2 and inf{f(x) : x ∈ [ai, bi]} = −2. Let u
∗
k : [a, b] → R be
the function that coincides with fi on each [ai, bi]. Let k be the preference
relation represented by u∗k, and note that k strongly rationalizes the choice
function of order k generated by ∗, and is continuous.
Let x, y ∈ X . For each k, suppose that x ∈ [ai, bi] for the kth sequence of
subintervals. Let xk ∈ [ai, bi] be such that u
∗
k(xk) = 2. Note that ‖x − xk‖ <
1/k. Similarly, suppose that y ∈ [aj, bj ] for the kth sequence of subintervals
14It is obvious that such a sequence exists. First, it is immediate that it exists for n = 1.
For n > 1 project each Bk onto each of its coordinate and carry out the one-dimensional
construction (choosing a sufficiently small radius for the balls covering each interval). Then
take the cartesian product of each one-dimensional interval.
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and let yk ∈ [aj, bj ] be such that u
∗
k(yk) = −2. Then xk ≻k yk. Since (xk, yk)→
(x, y) and x, y ∈ X were arbitrary this means that k→ X ×X .
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 12
The proof is implied by the following lemmas.
Lemma 24. Let X ⊆ Rn. If {x′n} is an increasing sequence in X, and {x
′′
n}
is a decreasing sequence, such that sup{x′n : n ≥ 1} = x
∗ = inf{x′′n : n ≥ 1}.
Then
lim
n→∞
x′n = x
∗ = lim
n→∞
x′′n.
Proof. This is obvously true for n = 1. For n > 1, convergence and sups and
infs are obtained component-by-component, so the result follows. 
Lemma 25. Let X ⊆ Rn. Let {xn} be a convergent sequence in X, with
xn → x
∗. Then there is an increasing sequence {x′n} and an a decreasing
sequence {x′′n} such that x
′
n ≤ xn ≤ x
′′
n, and limn→∞ x
′
n = x
∗ = limn→∞ x
′′
n.
Proof. Suppose that xn → x
∗. Define x′n and x
′′
n by
x′n = inf{xm : n ≤ m} and x
′′
n = sup{xm : n ≤ m}
Then it is clear that x′n ≤ xn ≤ x
′′
n, that x
′
n is increasing, and that x
′′
n is
decreasing. Moreover,
lim
n→∞
x′n = sup{inf{xm : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1}
= x∗
= inf{sup{xm : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1} = lim
n→∞
x′′n
by Lemma 24. 
Lemma 26. Let X = ∆([a, b]). Let {xn} be a convergent sequence in X,
with xn → x
∗. Then there is an increasing sequence {x′n} and an a decreasing
sequence {x′′n} such that x
′
n ≤ xn ≤ x
′′
n, and limn→∞ x
′
n = x
∗ = limn→∞ x
′′
n.
Proof. The set X ordered by first order stochastic dominance is a complete
lattice (see, for example, Lemma 3.1 in Kertz and Ro¨sler (2000)). Suppose
that xn → x
∗. Define x′n and x
′′
n by x
′
n = inf{xm : n ≤ m} and x
′′
n = sup{xm :
36 CHAMBERS, ECHENIQUE, AND LAMBERT
n ≤ m}. Clearly, {x′n} is an increasing sequence, {x
′′
n} is decreasing, and
x′n ≤ xn ≤ x
′′
n.
Let Fx denote the cdf associated with x. Note that Fx′′n(r) = inf{Fxm(r) :
n ≤ m} while Fx′n(r) is the right-continuous modification of sup{Fxm(r) : n ≤
m}. For any point of continuity r of F , Fxm(r)→ Fx∗(r), so
Fx(r) = sup{inf{Fxm(r) : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1}
by Lemma 24.
Moreover, Fx∗(r) = inf{sup{Fxm(r) : n ≤ m} : n ≥ 1}. Let ε > 0. Then
Fx∗(r−ε)← sup{Fxm(r−ε) : n ≤ m} ≤ Fx′n(r) ≤ sup{Fxm(r+ε) : n ≤ m} → Fx∗(r+ε)
Then Fx′n(r)→ Fx∗(r), as r is a point of continuity of Fx∗ . 
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 27. Let X = Rn+ with the standard vector order ≤, and let B = Q
n
+.
Then the countable order property is satisfied.
Our last lemma is a direct implication of Theorem 15.11 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006).
Lemma 28. Let a, b ∈ R, where a < b. Let X = ∆([a, b]), the set of Borel
probability distributions on [a, b] endowed with the weak* topology. Let B be
the set of probability distributions p with finite support on Q∩ [a, b], where for
all q ∈ Q ∩ [a, b], p(q) ∈ Q. Then the countable order property is satisfied.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorems 9, 21, 22 and 10
In this section, we let R
mon
denote the set of complete, continuous, and
strictly monotonic binary relations. Members of R
mon
need not be transitive.
Likewise, R
ls
is the set of complete, continuous, and locally strict binary
relations.
We record the following fact:
Lemma 29. Let  be a continuous binary relation. If x ≻ y then there are
neighborhoods Vx of x and Vy of y such that x
′ ≻ y′ for all x′ ∈ Vx and y
′ ∈ Vy.
We now prove Theorems 21 and 22.
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Proof of Theorem 21. Follows directly from Lemma 32, below. 
Proof of Theorem 22. First, it is straightforward to show that x ≻ y implies
x ′ y. Because otherwise there are x, y for which x ≻ y and y ≻′ x. Take an
open neighborhood U about (x, y) and a pair (z, w) ∈ U ∩ (B × B) for which
z ≻ w and w ≻′ z, a contradiction. Symmetrically, we also have x ≻′ y implies
x  y.
Now, without loss, suppose that there is a pair x, y for which x ≻ y and x ∼′
y. By connectedness and continuity, V = {z : x ≻ z ≻ y} is nonempty and by
continuity it is open.15 We claim that there is a pair (w, z) ∈ (V ×V )∩(B×B)
for which w ≻ z. By denseness of B, there is w ∈ V ∩B for which x ≻ w ≻ y.
Similarly, {z : w ≻ z ≻ y} is nonempty and open; so there is z ∈ B for which
x ≻ w ≻ z ≻ y.
We have shown that there is (w, z) ∈ (V × V ) ∩ (B × B) for which w ≻ z,
so that x ≻ w ≻ z ≻ y. Further, we have hypothesized that x ∼′ y. By the
first paragraph, we know that x ′ w ′ z ′ y. If, by means of contradiction,
we have w ≻′ z, then x ≻′ y, a contradiction. So w ∼′ z and w ≻ z, a
contradiction to B×B=
′
B×B . 
Lemma 30. Let A ⊆ X × X. Then {: A ⊆} is closed in the closed
convergence topology.
Proof. Let n be a convergent sequence in the set in question, where n→.
Then for all (x, y) ∈ A, we have x n y, hence x  y. So (x, y) ∈. 
Lemma 31. Suppose X is locally compact Polish, and that < has open inter-
vals. Then R
mon
is closed in the topology of closed convergence.
Proof. By Lemma 8, since X is locally compact Polish, the topology of closed
convergence is compact metrizable.
Suppose n→ where each n is continuous, strictly monotonic, and com-
plete. We know that  is continuous by compactness. Suppose by means of
15The argument for nonemptiness is as follows. If, by means of contradiction, V = ∅, then
{z : x ≻ z} and {z : z ≻ y} are nonempty open sets. Further, for any z ∈ X , either x ≻ z
or z ≻ y (because if ¬(x ≻ z) then by completeness z  x, which implies that z ≻ y).
Conclude that {z : x ≻ z} ∪ {z : z ≻ y} = X and each of the sets are nonempty and open
(by continuity); these sets are disjoint, violating connectedness of X .
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contradiction that  is not strictly monotonic, so that there are x, y ∈ X for
which x > y and y  x. Then there are (xn, yn)→ (x, y) for which yn n xn.
For n large, xn > yn, a contradiction to the fact that n is strictly monotonic.
Finally, completeness follows as for each x, y, either x n y or y n x, so there
is a subsequence nk for which either x nk y or for which y nk x. 
Lemma 32. Suppose that B is dense, ′ is complete, and each of  and ∗
are continuous and locally strict complete relations. Then if
′ |B×B ⊆
∗ |B×B∩  |B×B,
it follows that ∗=.
Proof. Suppose, by means of contradiction and without loss of generality, that
there are x, y ∈ X for which x ∗ y and y ≻ x. By continuity of  and local
strictness of ∗, we can without loss of generality assume that x ≻∗ y and
y ≻ x. By continuity of each of  and ∗, there exists a, b ∈ B such that
a ≻∗ b and b ≻ a. But by completeness of ′, either a ′ b, contradicting
′ |B×B ⊆ |B×B, or b 
′ a, contradicting ′ |B×B ⊆
∗ |B×B. 
We now turn to the main proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 9. By Lemma 31, R
mon
is compact. Let ′ be any strictly
monotonic and complete binary relation such that for all k and all {x, y} ∈ Σk,
x ∈ ck({x, y}) if and only if x ′ y (′ exists by the projection requirement
on choice sequences, and by the fact that c ⊑ c∗).
For each k, let ′k= {(x, y) : {x, y} ∈ {B1, . . . , Bk} and x 
′ y}.
For each k, let
Pk = {∈ R
mon
:′k⊆},
the set of relations which weakly rationalize c. Observe by definition that by
Lemma 30, Pk is closed, and hence compact. By assumption, each ∈ Pk
satisfies ∈ R
ls
, and obviously, for all k, ∗∈ Pk. Further, observe that⋂
k Pk = {
∗}, since if ∈
⋂
k Pk, by definition 
′
B×B⊆
∗ |B×B∩  |B×B and
Lemma 32.
The result now follows as each Pi is compact and
⋂
k Pk = {
∗}. That is, let
k∈ Pk, which is a decreasing, nested collection of compact sets. Suppose by
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means of contradiction and without loss that k→
′ 6=∗, and observe then
that it follows that ′∈ Pk for all k, contradicting
⋂
i Pi = {
∗}. 
Proof of Theorem 10. Observe that for any k, the set
Pk = {∈ R
mon
: weakly rationalizes ck}
is closed, and hence compact by Lemma 30. Observe that Pk(c) ⊆ Pk. More-
over, it is obvious that Pk+1 ⊆ Pk. Suppose that there is no k for which
Pk(c) = ∅. Then, since each Pk 6= ∅ and each Pk is compact,
⋂
k Pk 6= ∅. Let
∗∈
⋂
k Pk.
We claim that
⋂
k Pk = {
∗}. Suppose by means of contradiction that there
is 6=∗ where ∈
⋂
k Pk. Let 
′ be any complete relation such that for all
(a, b) ∈ B×B, a ′ b if and only if a ∈ ck({a, b}), for k such that {a, b} ∈ Σk.
Then, by definition of weak rationalization, we have ′B×B⊆B×B ∩ 
∗
B×B .
Appeal to Lemma 32 to conclude that =∗, a contradiction.
Finally, since
⋂
k Pk = {
∗}, and each Pk is compact, it follows that limk→∞ diam(Pk)→
0.16 Hence, since 0 ≤ diam(Pk(c)) ≤ diam(Pk), the result follows.

Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 11
The set of weakly monotone and continuous binary relations is compact in
the topology of closed convergence. Suppose wlog that k→. Then  is a
continuous binary relation. We shall prove that =∗.
First we show that x ≻∗ y implies that x ≻ y. So let x ≻∗ y. Let U and
V be neighborhoods of x and y, respectively, such that x′ ≻∗ y′ for all x′ ∈ U
and y′ ∈ V . Such neighborhoods exist by the continuity of ∗. We prove first
that if (x′, y′) ∈ U × V , then there exists N such that x′ ≻n y
′ for all n ≥ N .
By hypothesis, there exist x′′ ∈ U ∩ B and y′′ ∈ V ∩ B such that x′′ ≤ x′ and
y′ ≤ y′′. Each n is a strong rationalization of the finite experiment of order
n, so if {x˜, y˜} ∈ Σn then x˜ ≻n y˜ implies that x˜ ≻m y˜ for all m ≥ n. Since
x′′, y′′ ∈ B, there is N is such that {x′′, y′′} ∈ ΣN . Thus x
′′ ≻∗ y′′ implies that
x′′ ≻n y
′′ for all n ≥ N . So, for n ≥ N , x′ ≻n y
′, as n is weakly monotone.
16Otherwise, we could choose ǫ > 0 and two subsequences kl ,
′
kl
such that δC(kl ,
′
kl
) ≥ ǫ and kl→∈
⋂
k
Pk and 
′
kl
→′∈
⋂
k
Pk where δC(,
′) ≥ ǫ, a contradiction.
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Now we establish that x ≻ y. Let {(xn, yn)} be an arbitrary sequence with
(xn, yn) → (x, y). By hypothesis, there is an increasing sequence {x
′
n}, and
a decreasing sequence {y′n}, such that x
′
n ≤ xn and yn ≤ y
′
n while (x, y) =
limn→∞(x
′
n, y
′
n).
Let N be large enough that x′N ∈ U and y
′
N ∈ V . Let N
′ ≥ N be such
that x′N ≻n y
′
N for all n ≥ N
′ (we established the existence of such N ′ above).
Then, for any n ≥ N ′ we have that
xn ≥ x
′
n ≥ x
′
N ≻n y
′
N ≥ y
′
n ≥ yn.
By the weak monotonicity of n, then, xn ≻n yn. The sequence {(xn, yn)}
was arbitrary, so (y, x) /∈= limn→∞ n. Thus ¬(y  x). Completeness of 
implies that x ≻ y.
In second place we show that if x ∗ y then x  y, thus completing the
proof. So let x ∗ y. We recursively construct sequences xnk , ynk such that
xnk nk ynk and xnk → x, ynk → y.
So, for any k ≥ 1, choose x′ ∈ Nx(1/k)∩B with x
′ ≥ x, and y′ ∈ Ny(1/k)∩B
with y′ ≤ y; so that x′ ∗ x ∗ y ∗ y′, as ∗ is weakly monotone. Recall
that n strongly rationalizes c∗ for Σn. So x
′ ∗ y′ and x′, y′ ∈ B imply that
x′ n y
′ for all n large enough. Let nk > nk−1 (where we can take n0 = 0)
such that x′ nk y
′; and let xnk = x′ and ynk = y′.
Then we have (xnk , ynk)→ (x, y) and xnk nk ynk . Thus x  y.
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 15 and Proposition 5
We begin with two useful lemmas.
Lemma 33. Φ is an open map if for any u∗ ∈ U and any sequence n in R
with n→ Φ(u
∗), there is a sequence {un} in U such that un ∈ Φ
−1(n) and
un → u
∗ in the topology of compact convergence.
Proof. Suppose that there is V ⊆ U open, but Φ(V ) is not open. Then there
is u∗ ∈ V and n /∈ Φ(V ) such that n→ Φ(u
∗) (since closed convergence
topology is metrizable). Since u∗ ∈ V , any sequence un ∈ Φ
−1(n) for which
un → u
∗ eventually has un ∈ V . But if un is chosen to represent n, this
implies that Φ(un) ∈ Φ(V ) for n large, a contradiction. 
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Lemma 34. For any  and x ∈ X, there is a unique m∗(x) ∈ M with
x ∼ m∗(x). Moreover, if we fix u ∈ U then the function u : X → R defined
by u(x) = u(m
∗(x)) is a continuous utility representation of .
Proof. Consider the sets A = {m ∈ M : m  x} and B = {m ∈ M : x 
m}. These sets are closed because  is continuous, their union is M as  is
complete, and they are nonempty as  is monotone and there exist m,m ∈M
with m ≤ x ≤ m by our hypothesis on M . M is connected, so A and B
cannot be disjoint; hence there is m ∈M with x ∼ m. This m must be unique
because M is totally ordered, and  is strictly monotone.
We now show that u is a continuous utility representation of . Let x  y.
Then transitivity and monotonicity of  imply that m∗(x) ≥ m∗(y). Thus
u(x) = u
∗(m∗(x)) ≥ u∗(m∗(y)) = u(y). The converse implications hold as
well; thus u represents .
To prove continuity, let xn → x
∗. We shall prove that mn = m
∗(xn) →
m∗(x∗) = mˆ. Suppose first that mˆ is not the largest or the least element of
M . For each neighborhood U of mˆ there exists, by our hypothesis on M ,
m,m ∈M with m < mˆ < m and [m,m] ⊆ U . Then
V = {z ∈ X : m ≻ z} ∩ {z ∈ X : z ≻ m}
is a neighborhood of x∗, as x∗ ∼ mˆ and  is continuous and monotone. For
large enough n then xn ∈ V , so mn ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U . Suppose now that mˆ is
the largest element of M . Then, reasoning as above, xn ∈ {z ∈ X : z ≻ m}
for all large enough n, so that m ≤ mn. We have mn ≤ m as m is the largest
element of M . Thus mn ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U . The argument when m is the least
element of M is analogous. 
We now turn to the main proof of the theorem, which proves Proposition 5.
Proof of Theorem 15. Let u∗ ∈ U and {n} be a sequence in R with n→
Φ(u∗). By Lemma 33 it is enough to exhibit a sequence un ∈ Φ
−1(n) and
un → u
∗ in the topology of compact convergence.
Let un = un as defined in Lemma 34 from u
∗. Lemma 34 implies that
un ∈ Φ
−1(n). By XII Theorem 7.5 p. 268 of Dugundji (1966), to establish
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compact convergence it is enough to show that for any convergent sequence
{xn}, with xn → x
∗, un(xn)→ u
∗(x∗).
To this end, let xn → x
∗. Let mˆ = m∗(x∗) andmn ∼n xn, using the notation
in Lemma 34, and U be a neighborhood of mˆ. Let m,m ∈ M be such that
m < mˆ < m and [m,m] ⊆ U . Then it must be true that mn ∈ [m,m] for
all n large enough. To see this, note that if, for example, mn ≥ m infinitely
often then there would exist a subsequence for which xn n mn  m (by
monotonicity of ), which would imply that x∗  m > mˆ, as n→. But
mˆ ∼ x∗  m is a violation of monotonicity.
Now mn ∈ [m,m] ⊆ U for all n large enough means that mn → mˆ. Thus
un(xn) = u
∗(xn)→ u
∗(x∗) = u(x
∗),
as u∗ is continuous. 
Appendix G. Proof of Theorem 18
By Theorem 8 of Border and Segal (1994), Φ(V) is compact, and therefore
k possesses a limit point 
∗∈ Φ(V). By Lemma 30, the set of k weakly
rationalizing ck is closed, and hence compact. Suppose by means of contra-
diction that there is some ′k also weakly rationalizing c
k which converges to
6=∗. Observe that each of ∗ and  weakly rationalize each ck.
Finally, let ′ be any complete relation such that for all (a, b) ∈ B × B,
a ′ b if and only if a ∈ ck({a, b}), for k such that {a, b} ∈ Σk. Then, by
definition of weak rationalization, we have ′B×B⊆B×B ∩ 
∗
B×B . Appeal
then to Lemma 32 to conclude that =∗, a contradiction.
